

Laser Safety Review Preparations

FEBRUARY 29th at 9 h @ CERN, BUILDING 40, Room 4- C01

(this is a one day meeting)

The safety aspects of the following 4 LASER systems will be reviewed:

- 1) Laser Front End Links M. Pearce
- 2) Inner Detector(SCT) alignment lasers D.F.Howell
- 3) Tile Detector calibration system F. Vazeille
- 4) Muon Detector alignment system C. Guyot (tbc)

The reviewers will be the following 4 experts:

- M. Hoefert Cern/TIS
- G. Roubaud Cern/TIS
- W. Weingarten Cern/TIS
- J. O'Hagan NRPB/UK (National Radiological Protection Board)

Documentation

http://www.cern.ch/Atlas/GROUPS/FRONTEND/links/install/laser_safety

- Introduction to ATLAS Systems Safety Review (ASSR)
- Guidelines for writing ASSR reports:
 - Description of systems concerned
 - Description of identified hazards
 - Risk elimination or mitigation during the design phase
 - Risk mitigating actions and safety measures
 - Residual hazards and risks
- Working document on Laser Safety in ATLAS / V1.1 (6th February 2000)
 - SCT + LArg used as prototype systems
 - Other systems not expected to raise significant new safety issues

No longer a draft!



Working Document on Laser Safety

- VCSEL-based links operating with MM fibres at 850nm
- Document based on recommendations laid out in:
 - IEC 825-1 : ‘self-contained laser products’ (TIS note 22 uses this)
 - IEC 825-2 : ‘Extension to cover optical fibres’
- Strategy:
 - Identify and classify (1, 2, 3A, k x 3A and 3B) potential hazards
 - Implement appropriate control measures to prevent or reduce exposure to acceptable levels
- Laser classification = $f(\lambda, \text{emission time, emission angle, radiated power})$
- Off the shelf links are *often* CLASS 1 - no additional measures required for use
- No CLASS 2 ratings as VCSELs emit invisible light
- No CLASS 4 ratings as all output powers < 500mW for FE-Links
- CLASSes 3A, k x 3A and 3B apply [k x 3A extends 3A into 3B for fibre optic systems]

Laser Classifications

- ‘Simple’ rules for single fibres and connectors outlined in IEC documentation
- Fibre ribbons are more complicated:
 - Broken ribbon can be treated as bundle of randomly pointing fibres. Radiation field is **not** additive.
 - **BUT** ... if ends are cleaved and polished (ie: MT connector) then radiation fields **are** additive, ie: lower power per fibre is tolerated for a given hazard level.
- Working assumptions:
 - **SCT**: Typical Fibre Coupled Power (FCP) = 300 - 500 μ W / Max FCP = 2mW
 - **LArg**: Max output power = 3mW / Max FCP = 2mW
 - NA (min) = 0.18
- So:
 - **Single fibres**: <2.2mW per fibre for 3A / <6.6 mW per fibre for k x 3A, so: **k x 3A**
 - **MT**: <0.18mW per fibre for 3A / <0.55mW per fibre for k x 3A, so: **3B**

MUST BE FAIL-SAFE !

Actions Arising from Classifications

- Safety requirements depend on location of equipment:
 - ‘Controlled access’ - Cable ducts etc.
 - ‘Restricted access’ - Industrial / commercial premises
 - ‘Unrestricted access’ - Domestic
- ATLAS has ‘Restricted access’ : so, **systems must be 1, 2, 3A or k x 3A**
- If $< k \times 3A$, mechanical protection, labelling and good engineering practices suffice
- **If 3B systems exist, must reduce exposure levels to k x 3A or less**
- Normally one can simply totally enclose affected parts BUT must account for test and maintenance periods - there will be many in ATLAS
- IEC requires:
 - Automatic Power Reduction (APR)
 - Extra mechanical protection
 - Special tools to demate connectors

Proposed Measures

- Vast majority of fibres are $< k \times 3A$, so:
 - Mark to distinguish from other services
 - Mechanical protection to IEC-794-2
 - Connectors $>3A$ labelled (if not enclosed) and require special tool to demate
 - NB: No sense fibre needed for 96-fibre cable!
- MT-12 based patch panels (on and off-detector) - need to reduce to $< k \times 3A$:
 - Totally enclose patch panels (labelled / robust / tool to open / warning lights)
 - Shuttered MT connectors could be OK - need to verify.
 - Otherwise: fail-safe hard wired interlocks to turn off VCSELs if MT-12's are exposed (definitely needed for SCT, as shutters impractical)
 - Need to be radiation tolerant / fit into detector grounding rules or be optical (eye-safe!) / shouldn't go through DCS etc.